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very superficial and stands or falls on the Harrison precedent. The
dissenting judgments are, in some places, logically sound but, in
others, display an unhealthy placid acceptance of lower court's reasoning. The one recurring theme throughout all the judgments is
the universal dissatisfaction with s. 105(2) of The Highway Traffic
Act.29 If this man-made barrier to the logical application of equitable
principles had not been present, a large segment of the artificiality
in the reasoning of the Courts would have been eradicated. This subsection has resulted in untold injustice and needless suffering and it
is to be hoped that the Ontario Legislature will shortly awaken to its
responsibilities and repeal this odious subsection which has been
called one of the "most vicious pieces of legislation which an
active
30
insurance lobby was able to foist on an unsuspecting public."
THOMAS J. LOCKWOOD*

Sterling Trusts Corporationet al. v. Postma and Little, [1965] S.C.R.
324.
MOTOR VEHICLES -

NEGLIGENCE -

TRUCK INVOLVED IN

COLLISION

BETWEEN TWO AUTOMOBILES - OWNER AND DRIVER OF TRUCK FOUND
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DRIVER OF ONE OF THE AUTOMOBILES - DRIVER OF AUTOMOBILE ALONE HELD LIABLE ON APPEAL NEW TRIAL ORDERED BY SUPREME COURT ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS.

In the case of Sterling Trusts Corporationet al. v. Postma and
Little,' the Supreme Court of Canada had to determine the effect of
breach by the driver of a motor vehicle of a statutory provision (i.e.
The Highway Traffic Act 2 ) designed for the protection of other users
of the highway (viz. failing to have illuminated a tail light at night).
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on the evening
of December 19, 1959, after dark at a point about two miles west of
Trenton, Ontario on highway No. 2. The night was clear and the
paved highway was dry and straight so that from the crest of a knoll
more than 420 feet to the east of the estimated point of collision
there was clear visibility. Henry Postma was proceeding west in his
1953 Meteor at a speed of "at least 50 to 55 miles per hour" when,
29 Supra, footnote 2.
30

C. A. Wright (1945), 23 Can. Bar Rev. 344, at p. 347.

* Thomas J. Lockwood, B.A. (McGill), is a second year student at Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 [1965] S.C.R. 324, 48 D.L.R. (2d) 423.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172. S. 33(1) '"WVhen on a highway at any time from
one-half hour after sunset to one half-hour before sunrise every motor vehicle
shall carry three lighted lamps in a conspicuous position, one on each side of
the front which shall cast a white, green or amber coloured light only, and
one on the back of the vehicle which shall cast from its face a red light only,
•
and any lamp so used shall be clearly visible at a distance of at least
5feet
from the front or rear as the case may be."
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after breasting the knoll he was momentarily blinded by the headlights of an oncoming car. He saw "a flicker of a light" ahead of him
and then noticed for the first time the presence of what turned out
to be the westbound truck, driven by Fred A. Little, proceeding
slowly and only three or four car lengths ahead. He applied his brakes
and skidded a distance of 125 feet on his own side of the road when,
fearful of hitting the truck, he veered to the left and skidded a further
15 feet before colliding with the Brown vehicle, a 1956 Volkswagen,
which was proceeding in an easterly direction on its own side of the
highway and the lights of which, according to Postma, had not been
seen by him until he turned into the eastbound lane. As a result of
the accident, Mrs. Brown was killed and Mr. Brown was permanently
injured.
Prior to this decision, the law in Ontario with respect to breach
of The Highway Traffic Act 3 being evidence of negligence, was that
the breach must be shown to be a proximate cause of the injury
complained of, and whether such breach is negligence causing or
contributing to the accident is a question of fact depending on the
circumstances in each case.4 And, even if a failure to comply with
the provisions of the Act is found to have caused or contributed to
the accident, no civil liability will attach if such failure was not an
act of conscious volition. 5 The plaintiff, claiming damages, had to
allege and prove negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle
and it was insufficient merely to rely upon a breach of a statutory
duty; it was not the intention of the Legislature that everyone injured
through a breach of any statutory requirement should have a right
of civil action against the offender for damages. 6 The Supreme Court7
of Canada, in Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma and Little,
decided otherwise.
Two unchallenged findings were that (i) Postma, by his negligence caused the collision, and (ii) Brown was not guilty of negligence. The primary issue with respect to Little was whether or not
the tail light on his vehicle was lit.
The trial judge found Postma liable for negligence and also found
Little liable on that ground that he failed to satisfy the onus of
showing that his tail light was lit. The Court of Appeal affirmed
Postma's liability but allowed Little's appeal on the ground that the
trial judge had misdirected himself in holding that there was a burden
on Little to establish that the tail light was illuminated, and on the
ground of certain answers made by Little on examination for discovery when he stated that the tail light had been working. The
Court of Appeal itself erred when it acted upon statements made on
examination for discovery which had not been adduced in evidence
Ibid.
Bruce v. McIntyre, [1954] O.R. 265, at p. 277 (Ont. C.A.); aff'd. [1955]
S.C.R. 251.
5 York v. Heffernan, [1962] O.W.N. 169.
6 Falsettov. Brown, [1933] O.R. 645.
7 Supra, footnote 1.
3
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at trial. The appeal of Sterling Trusts Corporation was allowed by
the Supreme Court of Canada and a new trial ordered to answer the
vital question whether or not their tail light was lit at the relevant
time.
Mr. Justice Cartwright (for the majority) stated that if it were
established at this new trial that the tail light was not lit, then there
was evidence to support the finding of the trial judge that this statutory breach was an effective cause of the collision. If this were established, then, according to Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. Ltd. v. M'Mullan,8
the respondents would be prima facie liable for the damages suffered
by the appellants. The question, therefore, arises whether Little can
absolve himself from liability by showing that he had done everything that a reasonable man could have done under the circumstances
to prevent the occurrence of the breach. The case of London Passenger
Transport Board v. Upson9 seems to suggest that this can be done
by showing that under the circumstances it was impossible for the
defendants to avoid committing the breach so that the maxim lex
non cogit ad impossibilia applies. On the other hand, in Galashiels
Gas Co. Ltd. v. O'Donnell (or Millar),10 the House of Lords held the
statutory duty, there under consideration, to be absolute. Mr. Justice
Cartwright felt that it was not necessary to decide whether the
statutory duty to have the tail light illuminated was absolute, because
the respondent had not discharged the burden of proof. Little's position was not that there was a sufficient explanation to account for
and excuse the fact that the light was not on; rather, his position
was that the light was in fact on at all relevant times. If the burden
could be discharged simply by showing that the person upon whom
it lay neither intended nor knew of the breach, the protection which
it is the statute's purpose to afford would in most cases prove illusory.
In Falsetto v. Brown," where an automobile had run into the
rear of a stationary truck in darkness, it was found that the efficient
cause of the accident, the causa causans was the negligence of the
driver of the sedan because he was driving too fast under the weather
conditions and was not keeping a proper look-out. It made no difference that the tail light of the truck was not illuminated.
In the Falsetto case, Davis J.A., gave an additional reason for
12
his decision:
The statutory duty to have a red tail lamp burning at certain times
imposed by the statute is a public duty only to be enforced by the penalty
imposed for a breach of it, and it was not the intention of the Legislature
that everyone injured through a breach of any statutory requirement
should have a right of civil action against the owner for damages.
[1934] A.C. 1.
9 [1949] A.C. 155, at p. 173.
10 [1949] A C. 275.
11 Supra, footnote 6.
12 Ibid., at p. 656.
8
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In Irvine v. Metropolitan Transport Co., 13 Masten J.A., in dealing
with the question whether the defendant's breach of the statutory
provisions gave the plaintiff a right of action, said: 14
...
I think that, notwithstanding that the section prescribes a penalty
for breach of the duty imposed, it also creates a cause of action in favour
of a particular class of persons, namely those who are travelling on the
highway and suffer damage from breach of the statute. My reasons are
(1) that the legislation is for the protection of one particular class of the
community; (2) that the penalty is not payable to the party injured; (3)
that a penalty of $5.00 up to $50.00 would in most cases be a wholly
inadequate compensation for the damages suffered.

Mr. Justice Cartwright accepted the reasoning of Masten J.A.,
on this point in the Irvine case 15 over that of Davis J.A., in the
Falsetto case 16 and expressed the view that a section might, notwithstanding that it prescribes a penalty for breach of the duty imposed,
also create a cause of action in favor of persons who are travelling
on the highway and suffer damage from the breach of the statute.
Mr. Justice Ritchie (Judson J. concurring) dissented on the
grounds that he was not satisfied by the evidence that any negligent
manoeuver by Little caused or contributed to the accident and he
felt that the case could be disposed of as it was by the Court of
Appeal on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the tail light on the Little truck was either
not operating or defective and that this constituted negligence which
contributed to the accident.17 As far as the effect of a breach of
the statutory duty for which provision is made in s. 51(2) of The
Highway Traffic Act, 18 both Ritchie and Judson JJ. adopted the
reasoning of Mr. Justice Cartwright.
The decision to order a new trial was made by a slim majority
of three to two.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Canada ought to have
decided the liability of Little either to Postma or to Sterling Trusts
Corporation rather than have ordered a new trial. First, it is doubtful
whether any new evidence would be discovered. The accident occurred
almost five years prior to the hearing before the Supreme Court of
Canada and it would take longer still to have a new trial. Furthermore, Little had died in the interval, Mr. Brown the plaintiff, was
unable to give any evidence whatsoever as to what caused the accident, Postma was characterized by the learned trial judge, Mr. Justice
Moorehouse, in his reasons for judgment as a "very confused young
man", and Mrs. Little was characterized as an elderly woman whose
memory was not good. Secondly, it is dubious whether the important
issue of the illumination of the tail light at the time of the accident,
could be determined from the available admissible evidence. Thirdly,
13 [19331 4 D.L.R. 682, [1933] O.R. 823.
14 P. 694 (D.L.R.), 833 (O.R.).

Is Supra, footnote 13.
16 Supra, at p. 432 (D.L.R.), 333 (S.C.R.).
17 Supra, at p. 439 (D.L.R.), 341 (S.C.R.).
18 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172.
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the prospect of the parties concerned embarking upon another long
trial involving possibly many more years, seems quite unlikely. Some
kind of settlement is a more probable result. 19 Finally, s. 106 of The
Highway Traffic Act,20 provides that, except in the case of a collision
between motor vehicles, whenever damage is sustained by any person
by reason of a motor vehicle on a highway, the onus is on the owner
or driver thereof to disprove negligence. Brown argued that applying
this section to the facts, Postma, swerved to avoid and pass a vehicle
driven by Brown because there was no collision between his and
Little's vehicle, the onus was upon the latter to disprove negligence
on his part, and not upon Brown to prove it. If this reasoning were
adopted it would mean that the owner or driver of the passed car
could become involved, by a mere allegation of negligence, in an
action in which he would be required to assume the burden of disproving his own negligence. It is submitted that the Legislature did
not mean to have such a construction put on s. 106.21 Consequently,
the case could have been disposed of as by the Court of Appeal on
the ground that the appellants failed to discharge the burden of
proving that the tail-light on the truck was either inoperative or
defective, and that that constituted negligence which contributed to
the accident.
The Supreme Court of Canada was correct in unanimously
holding that a breach, by the driver of a motor vehicle, of a statutory
provision designed for the protection of other users of the highway
(such as failing to have a lighted tail light when travelling at night),
and which breach is an effective cause of an accident, imposes at
least a prima facie liability on such driver.
One question left to be answered by some future decision is
whether this liability may be discharged by showing that the breach
occurred without negligence on the part of the driver.

J. RONALD SMITH"

TAXATION

Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12.
INCOME TAX - INVESTIGATION - INQUIRY BY PERSON AUTHORIZED BY
MINISTER INTO THE AFFAIRS OF TAXPAYER WHETHER TAXPAYER
ENTITLED TO BE PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT HEARINGS.

There is no equity in a taxing statute.

(Anon.)

19 That is exactly what happened in this case.
20 Supra, footnote 18.

21 Supra, footnote 18.
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